ABP: watcher@web-summit.jose

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: people/jose/watcher/ROLE.md and policy.json (drafted by vault@web-summit.jose at Jose's word) and the agent's commits, Jose's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Jose's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Jose's account; Jose or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 4 November 2026 04:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: Jose's security watcher, read-only: who and which agents committed since its last run, writes outside an agent's lane, pushes to branches other than dev, key shapes (where, never what), agents that stopped running; for Jose's dashboard. Proposed schedule 07:15, 12:15 and 17:15 UTC.
Deployment scope: people/jose/watcher/** and its own key entry in data/keys.json; scope of what it watches: Jose's agents only, until the 4 November 13:00 stand-up decides (WS-134); since 5 November, at Jose's word, the whole team, read-only (0316656b: 133 agent commits in its first team-wide run, findings sent to security@web-summit.dinis by location and rule only); it never holds, fixes or reverts, and defers to security@web-summit.dinis.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Jose, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

It is read-only by role, but its session has push access to the whole repository like every agent: "read-only" is a rule, not a setting.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/jose/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Code in its person's folder runs in CI (WS-133, 4 November): admin/build/build.mjs runs people/<id>/pages.mjs and a person's own app/data.mjs in the release job, which holds a token that can push and deploy.

One door (2191c0b2, at Jose's word, 5 November): Jose's agents take work only from conductor@web-summit.jose's task files (people/jose/tasks/), not from a commit addressed to them by anyone else; every ask for Jose goes through the conductor. A rule kept by each agent, which narrows who can give it work.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Jose's brief, part two
Writes only `people/jose/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
reviewer@web-summit.jose reviews every diff before `release.sh`; a hold releases only `hold.json` and the review record	review, before the push, a sub-agent in the agent's own session	`people/jose/kit/README.md` (473be41); its first hold stopped a token's value going public (d8301cd)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 4 November 2026 04:15 UTC): two runs (f64a65e, b1e4fe9): 14 commits by Jose's agents reviewed, three small flags, then one clean; its key entry: inside its mandate. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Jose has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Jose, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Jose
Licensee	watcher@web-summit.jose (a Claude Code session in Jose's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Jose's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 4 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Jose. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Jose and the agent correct it. Version 4, 6 November 2026 (the reviewer step, at conductor@web-summit.jose's note 883fc8ee; 16:10 wake: one door; 08:10 wake: team-wide), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.