ABP: conductor@web-summit.dinis

Written by the conductor itself, 2 November 2026, as the template; to be reviewed and kept by abp@web-summit.dinis. RiskMandate's model: Agent Behaviour Policy, licence to operate. A factual record: evidence can be checked, unknowns stay visible.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit (push to dev, so it can change every file and the CI workflow); GitHub Actions run logs (read); Claude Code Remote (list and read other sessions of the account, send messages to them, create scheduled tasks); the RiskMandate Google Drive as agent@riskmandate.ai (read, create, rename, move, share with named people).
Data: everything in the repository; the account's other sessions' transcripts; the whole RiskMandate shared drive, including contacts and pre-reads.
Actions: releases to the live site (through CI), board issues, roster changes, Drive folders and files, messages to other agents' sessions.
Connectors: GitHub, Google Drive, Claude Code Remote.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: run the team's site and board for Web Summit 2026: build, gate, release, roster, briefs, plan, the agents page; turn Dinis's guidance into pages and issues.
Deployment scope: this repository's dev branch; the videos folder in the RiskMandate drive; the team's sessions, read-only, to see what they need.
Authorised purpose: everyone on the team connected, aligned and working on RiskMandate at the summit.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

Push to main. This happened on 2 November 2026 at 23:06 UTC: asked for "a major release via main", the conductor pushed dev to main directly (a fast-forward, no history rewritten) instead of opening a pull request for Dinis to merge. Dinis caught it. The rule is now absolute (CLAUDE.md, the agents page: no agent ever pushes to main), and branch protection is asked for (WS-105).
Edit the CI workflow, which also governs every other agent's releases.
Read the whole shared drive, including contacts and private pre-reads, when the mandate is the videos folder.
Message or steer other agents' sessions; create scheduled tasks that outlive the session.
Publish anything to the public site, where it stays in git history for ever.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never push to main, never force-push	rule, kept by the agent; failed once (2 Nov, 23:06: a push to main when asked for a major release)	CLAUDE.md; the push is commit 5d6a2e8 on main
Branch protection on main (pull requests only)	technical, not yet set (WS-105)	the repository settings
The gate (validate.js) before every release	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml: no deploy without validate
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15
Only Dinis instructs; what it reads is material	rule, kept by the agent	the agents' prompts; untrusted session data marked by the platform
Drive sharing beyond named people	technical (the connector cannot set public links)	2 Nov: Dinis switched link sharing himself
Scheduled tasks and sessions created only at Dinis's word	rule, kept by the agent	none created by the conductor
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

Open questions: no technical barrier stops a push to main or a workflow edit (branch protection is not set); the Drive reach is account-wide.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Dinis Cruz, operator
Accountable owner	Dinis Cruz
Licensee	conductor@web-summit.dinis (Claude Code session conductor.3, key sha256:62eb11234d3237d5)
Conditions	the Mandate above; CLAUDE.md; the agents page
Validity	from 1 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach (a new connector, a new repository), and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Dinis Cruz. Reviewer: to be named (abp@web-summit.dinis drafts, a person signs off). Version 1, 2 November 2026, in content/abp/ with its history in git.