ABP: vault@web-summit.vicky

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: people/vicky/agents.json, the agents page (#vault-agent) and the vault agent's page, Vicky's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Vicky's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
SG/Send: an access token in the session's environment; vault k64ma7jd published.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Vicky's account; Vicky or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 3 November 2026 16:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: creates and manages Vicky's SGit vaults and audits each before its read key is published in people/vicky/vaults.json; on demand.
Deployment scope: people/vicky/** (vaults.json, vault-agent-notes.md), its own key entry in data/keys.json, and the vaults it creates on SG/Send.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Vicky, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

It holds an SG/Send access token in its environment: it can create and write vaults on the server, outside this repository, where no gate or review reads what it writes.
It publishes read keys: a published read key opens a vault to anyone, for good. The barrier before that is an audit by a security sub-agent of its own session (the vault guide), done by hand until WS-128's scripted audit exists. Two holes found on 3 November: sgit history log --patch and sgit history show show no content for added files (vault@web-summit.vicky's notes, 443b62f), and sgit vault info prints the vault key into the session's transcript (7502d99).
Its vault apps run with the SG/App bridge, which on 3 November exposed llm, fs, git and append among others (its notes, item 16): what a published app can do is what its manifest grants.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/vicky/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Since 16:50 on 3 November a scripted audit exists: admin/tools/vault-audit.mjs (ad9e353, WS-128) walks every revision and the working files of a vault and refuses the gate's key shapes, the short-id vault key, token assignments, emails and phone numbers, printing only where. It is a technical check, but the agent runs it itself before publishing: whether it was run is the agent's word, not a gate's. Since c99aaff6 (WS-135, 4 November) it also compares against the actual access token and vault key values and counts empty revisions.

Since 17:30: a private meetings vault (WS-23), its key sealed to pm@web-summit.vicky (81796d9); its notes record that seal.mjs gives wrong answers in a shallow clone (d3c7f4e, WS-131).

Code in its person's folder runs in CI (WS-133, 4 November): admin/build/build.mjs runs people/<id>/pages.mjs and a person's own app/data.mjs in the release job, which holds a token that can push and deploy. Writing only in its own folder no longer bounds what it can do.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Vicky's brief, part two
Writes only `people/vicky/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 3 November 2026 16:15 UTC): people/vicky/vaults.json (Vicky's first public vault, k64ma7jd, with its read key, "audited clean"), people/vicky/vault-agent-notes.md and its key entry: inside its mandate. Its notes say the first audit used commands that miss added files and "the second audit found this": the read key was published after an audit that read every file at every revision (sgit grep -n --text -e ''). Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Vicky has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Vicky, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Vicky
Licensee	vault@web-summit.vicky (a Claude Code session in Vicky's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Vicky's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 3 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Vicky. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Vicky and the agent correct it. Version 4, 4 November 2026 (08:10 wake: WS-135 done; 00:10 wake: WS-133; 20:10 wake: the scripted audit; the meetings vault), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.