ABP: team-collaboration@web-summit.angelo

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: Angelo's dashboard and people/angelo/agents.json, Angelo's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Angelo's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

• Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
• A calendar: the stand-ups put on it (its dashboard). Which account, and its rights, not known.
• Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Angelo's account; Angelo or the agent can list them.
• How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 2 November 2026 17:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

• Business task: the team's collaboration: the stand-up calendar, a brief, a debrief and follow-ups for every meeting (WS-96), the map of who works with whom, and a daily note on bottlenecks (WS-97); around each stand-up, 13:00 and 18:00 UTC.
• Deployment scope: people/angelo/** is its person's; the board (board/) and the stand-ups' agenda (data/meetings/) are everyone's; anything else goes through its owner or the conductor (Angelo's brief, part two, rules).
• Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
• Authorised by: Angelo, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

• 97ccdaa: "Both series ... now invite the seven going to Lisbon, from their workgroup accounts". Calendar invitations are messages to people; whether the agent or Angelo sent them is not recorded. Its brief's first rule is "never send". A question for Angelo at the next stand-up.
• 996cee0: at Angelo's word, its write access to the repository is its authorisation, so its session key is not linked to Angelo's or the operator's key: no key chain stands behind its commits, only the GitHub account.
• "Keeps the stand-ups on the calendar": it reaches a calendar. Whose calendar, and whether it can invite or message people, is not known from the repository.
• Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/angelo/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
• Push to main or rewrite history: main and dev are not protected (GitHub branches API, 2 November).
• Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

In the history (dev, read 2 November 2026 20:15 UTC): since 17:15 also 996cee0 and 97ccdaa, board WS-96 and its person's dashboard, inside its mandate. Earlier: 06cee32: people/angelo/agents.json, people/angelo/dashboard.md, two new board issues (WS-96, WS-97) and one stand-up agenda item in data/meetings/. Inside its mandate (the board and the agenda are everyone's). Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Angelo has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate

Provenance

Owner: Angelo. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Angelo and the agent correct it. Version 3, 3 November 2026 (00:10 wake: main pushed once, still unprotected; 20:10 wake: the invitations, the key), in content/abp/ with its history in git.