ABP: sgit@web-summit.silvio

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: the agents page, #vault-agent, the vault agent's page, and the agent's commits, Silvio Switha's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Silvio Switha's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
SG/Send: an access token in the session's environment (server access; the vault key is the encryption, c2d8d5d). Which vaults it has made is not recorded here.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Silvio Switha's account; Silvio Switha or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 3 November 2026 04:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: Silvio's vault agent (the agents page, #vault-agent: "an agent already named sgit@web-summit.<you> can do the same job"): creates and manages Silvio's SGit vaults with the SG/Send access token from the environment, publishes their read keys on /vaults/, sends vault keys only as sealed QR codes.
Deployment scope: people/silvio/** (it wrote people/silvio/kit/vaults.md), its own key entry in data/keys.json, and the vaults it creates; a read key is published only after a security sub-agent audits the vault.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Silvio Switha, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

It holds an SG/Send access token in its environment: it can create and write vaults on the server, outside this repository, where no gate or review reads what it writes.
It publishes read keys: a published read key opens a vault to anyone, for good. The barrier is the audit by a security sub-agent of its own session, not an independent review.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/silvio/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 00:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Code in its person's folder runs in CI (WS-133, 4 November): admin/build/build.mjs runs people/<id>/pages.mjs and a person's own app/data.mjs in the release job, which holds a token that can push and deploy. Writing only in its own folder no longer bounds what it can do.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Silvio Switha's brief, part two
Writes only `people/silvio/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 3 November 2026 04:15 UTC): people/silvio/kit/vaults.md, people/silvio/kit/README.md and its key entry: inside its mandate. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Silvio Switha has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Silvio Switha, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Silvio Switha
Licensee	sgit@web-summit.silvio (a Claude Code session in Silvio Switha's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Silvio Switha's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 3 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Silvio Switha. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Silvio Switha and the agent correct it. Version 2, 4 November 2026 (00:10 wake: WS-133), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.