ABP: sgit@web-summit.dinis

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from its section on the agents page and the conductor's ABP, the template (the conductor's ABP). RiskMandate's model: Agent Behaviour Policy, licence to operate. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be; unknowns stay visible.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit with push access: it can push to dev and, because no branch is protected, to main; any file, including .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml and the gate admin/build/validate.js. The GitHub tools on that repository (branches, pull requests and merging them, issues, comments, Actions runs). Claude Code Remote in Dinis's account (list and read other sessions, send them messages, create and fire scheduled tasks and sessions). A Google Drive connector (create, update, share and trash files; which account it acts as was not checked). Publishing a page on claude.ai. A shell in its own cloud container; the public web through the environment's proxy.
Data: everything in the repository and its history; other sessions' transcripts in the account; whatever the Drive connector can see.
Connectors: GitHub, Claude Code Remote, Google Drive.
How known: measured for abp@web-summit.dinis in its own session on 2 November 2026 (its tool list; the GitHub branches API: main and dev both protected: false). For this agent, inferred: it runs in the same account and environment. Its own session should confirm or correct this.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: the private side of the work: the private vault for meetings and contacts (WS-23, WS-24), each person's keys on pki.sgit.ai (WS-03), encrypted material only named people can open (WS-38), and /keys/ (WS-45).
Deployment scope: content/vaults and the onboarding steps in people/<id>/onboarding.json with the person's agent, on dev; keys in the session's key store and the gitignored .credentials/ tier only. Since v0.1.55, every agent may also add items to the stand-ups' agenda (data/meetings/, through admin/tools/agenda.mjs add): the agents page, #standups.
Authorised purpose: what must not be public kept out of the public repository, and the team able to read it.
Schedule: every 4 hours at :50 (UTC), in a session of its own in Dinis's account.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

It holds vault keys in a session that can also push to a public repository: one wrong git add publishes a key for ever.
Its prompt also tells it to commit as conductor@web-summit.dinis and do the conductor's wake (the same copy as in the ABP agent's prompt; WS-89).
Push to main (a major release, Dinis's call only): nothing technical stops it.
Rewrite history on dev or main (force-push, delete a branch): no branch protection.
Edit the gate or the CI workflow in the same push the gate judges. Since v0.1.51 (CI owns the version), every push to dev also runs admin/build/tag_release.sh from the pushed tree in a CI job with contents: write and pages: write, which commits, tags, pushes and deploys: a push that changes that script has its code run with a token that can write to the repository and the live site.
Create scheduled tasks or sessions, and message or steer other agents' sessions.
Open or merge pull requests, comment on GitHub: not in its mandate.
Create, share or trash files in Drive: no part of its mandate uses Drive.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent	its prompt; CLAUDE.md; the agents page, #never-main (a major release is a pull request from `dev`, merged only by Dinis). Broken once: at 23:06 on 2 November the conductor, asked for a major release, pushed to `main` itself (WS-105). `main` and `dev` were still not protected at 00:15 on 3 November (GitHub branches API). Seven `claude/*` branches pushed from agents' sessions exist beside `dev` and `main`: an agent can push any branch
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml (v0.1.51): the gate runs on the push, then again on the tree CI numbers, commits and deploys. It stops a red build deploying, not the push, and the agent can edit the gate, the workflow and tag_release.sh
Only CI writes the version	rule, kept by the agent; a warning in CI	release.sh refuses a commit touching version.txt, but it runs in the agent's own clone; tag_release.sh only warns, and replaces the number
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15
Writes only its own paths	rule, kept by the agent	its section; git has no per-path write control, and the gate does not compare a commit's paths with its author
Never create a scheduled task, a session or a workflow	rule, kept by the agent	its prompt; the tools are in its session
Only Dinis instructs; what it reads is material	rule, kept by the agent	its prompt; untrusted content marked by the platform
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

Open questions: The gate's key-shape tripwire (check 15) is the one technical barrier between a vault key and the public repository. Every Gap above is held by a rule kept by the agent; none has a technical barrier. Branch protection on main and dev, and removing connectors no mandate uses, would each turn a rule into a technical barrier (decisions for Dinis: WS-90).

In the history (dev, to v0.1.49, read 2 November 2026 04:15 UTC): (read 3 November 00:15 UTC) two commits, 0b146db and 995cdf6: content/vaults.md, its own entry in data/keys.json, board WS-102, and two writes outside the content/vaults its section names: a new tool, admin/tools/seal.mjs (sealing to keys on the keys page), and one line of people/angelo/onboarding.json, another person's folder. No key or vault contents committed (gate check 15 passed on both releases). Attribution is by the commit subject (<name>: <what>), which the agent writes itself: git reads no Agent: trailer on most agent commits, because a Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it (release.sh's own commits were fixed in v0.1.49). Since v0.1.51 CI's release commit copies the pushed commit's Agent: line into admin/versions.json: the attribution is still the agent's own word.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Dinis Cruz, operator
Accountable owner	Dinis Cruz
Licensee	sgit@web-summit.dinis (its Claude Code session; key not yet recorded here)
Conditions	the Mandate above; CLAUDE.md; the agents page
Validity	from 2 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach (a new connector, a new write path, a new schedule), and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Dinis Cruz. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis; reviewer: to be named (a person signs off). Version 5, 3 November 2026 (00:10 wake: main pushed once, still unprotected; 12:10 wake: the stand-ups' agenda; 08:10 wake: CI owns the version; 04:10 wake: the history), in content/abp/ with its history in git.