ABP: observability@web-summit.dinis

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: its commits (56578c23, fe3fea4a, bbf0c007 and others, each "at Dinis's word") and the agents page (#agent-log); it has no section of its own on the agents page at 04:15 UTC, Dinis Cruz's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Dinis Cruz's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
Same account as abp@web-summit.dinis: its tools are inferred from abp's session (GitHub, Claude Code Remote, Google Drive). Its vaults on SG/Send: aym98gsm, p96tiql4 and kuuqr3do.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Dinis Cruz's account; Dinis Cruz or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 5 November 2026 04:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Its cloud environment (measured 7 November in abp@web-summit.dinis's session, names only; inferred for this agent if it runs there): Dinis's "GS Send - Full internet access", with unrestricted network and the variables SG_SEND_ACCESS_TOKEN, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPEN_ROUTER_KEY and PT_PILOT_ACCESS_KEY: the operator's own SG/Send token and model keys reach every session in it (WS-188).

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: the team's observability: the agents' activity lane and its drain (WS-160), page views and reads on the site sealed in the browser and drained into encrypted vaults, the Observability section and live stats on the home page (WS-37).
Deployment scope: content/observability*, assets/obs-*.js, admin/tools/ (obs_drain.py, obs_lets.py, agent-log.mjs), people/dinis/observability/, its vaults (aym98gsm public, p96tiql4 app, kuuqr3do private); every agent's run record reaches it, sealed.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Dinis Cruz, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

It watches the people who read the site. assets/obs-dinis.js sends a view and a read for every page load, sealed, from every visitor's browser; the drain sorts readers into team, synthetic, crawlers and the rest, and public.json holds no anonymous visitor's detail (fe3fea4a). What a visitor is told is the site's participant disclosure; whether it names this telemetry is not checked here.
Every agent's run record comes to it. The agents' lane carries what each agent read and did, signed by that agent's key; the drain key and the lanes' enum key sit in its private vault kuuqr3do. One session reads the whole team's activity.
It writes the shared build, admin/tools/ and the home page, as dev@web-summit.dinis and the journalist also do: no order between them is recorded.
Code it adds to assets/ runs on the site's one origin, beside keys held in the browser (WS-117, WS-132); the vault app it runs is in a sandboxed opaque-origin frame, a real barrier for that part.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/dinis/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Dinis Cruz's brief, part two
Writes only `people/dinis/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 5 November 2026 04:15 UTC): admin/tools/, content/observability/, assets/obs-view.js and assets/obs-live.js, admin/build/, content/index.md, assets/vendor/sgit-ai/ (pinned, sha256 recorded) and people/dinis/: the shared build and the home page among them, "at Dinis's word". Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Dinis Cruz has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Dinis Cruz, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Dinis Cruz
Licensee	observability@web-summit.dinis (a Claude Code session in Dinis Cruz's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Dinis Cruz's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 5 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Dinis Cruz. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Dinis Cruz and the agent correct it. Version 2, 7 November 2026 (00:10 wake: the shared environment, WS-188), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.