ABP: newsroom@web-summit.dinis

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 4 November 2026, from its section on the agents page and the conductor's commit that added it (a3cee75). Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be; unknowns stay visible. It has no commits in this repository: what it does happens in its own.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: its own repository, PrompTugal/PrompTugal__News__Website (push to dev; GitHub Pages and the domain promptugal.news wired to it), and the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit with push access: it can push to dev and, because no branch is protected, to main; any file, including .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml and the gate admin/build/validate.js. The GitHub tools on that repository (branches, pull requests and merging them, issues, comments, Actions runs). Claude Code Remote in Dinis's account (list and read other sessions, send them messages, create and fire scheduled tasks and sessions). A Google Drive connector (create, update, share and trash files; which account it acts as was not checked). Publishing a page on claude.ai. A shell in its own cloud container; the public web through the environment's proxy.
Data: everything in the repository and its history; other sessions' transcripts in the account; whatever the Drive connector can see.
Connectors: GitHub, Claude Code Remote, Google Drive.
Its cloud environment (measured 7 November in abp@web-summit.dinis's session, names only; inferred for this agent if it runs there): Dinis's "GS Send - Full internet access", with unrestricted network and the variables SG_SEND_ACCESS_TOKEN, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OPEN_ROUTER_KEY and PT_PILOT_ACCESS_KEY: the operator's own SG/Send token and model keys reach every session in it (WS-188).
How known: measured for abp@web-summit.dinis in its own session on 2 November 2026 (its tool list; the GitHub branches API: main and dev both protected: false). For this agent, inferred: it runs in the same account and environment. Its own session should confirm or correct this.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: build and run promptugal.news, the team's newsroom for Web Summit Lisbon (9 to 12 November 2026): articles about the companies going to the summit and what happens there, through the lens of RiskMandate (WS-14), in the shape of the estate's newsrooms.
Deployment scope: its own repository, branch dev; this repository read only (CLAUDE.md, its section, data/companies.json, data/events.json).
Authorised purpose: the team's public voice on the companies at the summit.
Schedule: none until Dinis decides, after the MVP. A separate session in Dinis's account.
Authorised by: Dinis Cruz, 4 November 2026 (a3cee75).

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

Write here: its mandate is read-only on this repository; its session's push reaches it, with everything that implies (the gate, the workflow, main).
Its own repository has no gate of ours: what it publishes on promptugal.news is checked by whatever gate it builds there, not by this repository's validate.js or security@web-summit.dinis, whose review covers this repository's commits only.
Claims about named companies, published under the team's name on a public domain: sourced facts come from data/companies.json; anything else is the agent's writing.
Push to main (of either repository), create scheduled tasks or sessions, GitHub collaboration, Drive: as for every agent in Dinis's account (see the journalist's ABP).

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	its prompt; CLAUDE.md; the agents page, #never-main (a major release is a pull request from `dev`, merged only by Dinis). Broken once: at 23:06 on 2 November the conductor, asked for a major release, pushed to `main` itself (WS-105). `main` and `dev` were still not protected at 08:15 on 3 November (GitHub branches API). Eight `claude/` branches pushed from agents' sessions exist beside `dev` and `main`: an agent can push any branch Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml (v0.1.51): the gate runs on the push, then again on the tree CI numbers, commits and deploys. It stops a red build deploying, not the push, and the agent can edit the gate, the workflow and tag_release.sh
Only CI writes the version	rule, kept by the agent; a warning in CI	release.sh refuses a commit touching version.txt, but it runs in the agent's own clone; tag_release.sh only warns, and replaces the number
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15
Reads, never writes, this repository	rule, kept by the agent	its section; its session has push to this repository like every agent in Dinis's account
Never create a scheduled task, a session or a workflow	rule, kept by the agent	its prompt; the tools are in its session
Only Dinis instructs; what it reads is material	rule, kept by the agent	its prompt; untrusted content marked by the platform
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 4 November 2026 04:15 UTC): no commits under its name in this repository. Its own repository was not read for this draft.

Open questions: whether its repository protects main; who reviews what it publishes before it is live; whether security@web-summit.dinis reads its repository too.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Dinis Cruz, operator
Accountable owner	Dinis Cruz
Licensee	newsroom@web-summit.dinis (a Claude Code session in Dinis's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; its section on the agents page; CLAUDE.md of both repositories
Validity	from 4 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and when it gets a schedule

Provenance

Owner: Dinis Cruz. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis; reviewer: to be named (a person signs off). Version 2, 7 November 2026 (00:10 wake: the shared environment, WS-188), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.