ABP: dashboard@PrompTugal.angelo

Renamed from dashboard@web-summit.angelo to dashboard@PrompTugal.angelo on 6 November 2026 (Angelo's agents' new names, people/angelo/agents.json; it keeps its key and key id, at Angelo's word, fd819c3c). Earlier versions are in git at content/abp/dashboard-web-summit-angelo.md.

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: people/angelo/agents.json and the standard dashboard-agent prompt on the agents page, Angelo's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Angelo's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Angelo's account; Angelo or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 3 November 2026 12:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: keeps Angelo's command centre (his first view) and the classic dashboard, and asks Angelo one question a run; on a schedule at 07:30, 12:30 and 17:30 UTC.
Deployment scope: people/angelo/dashboard.md and its own entry in data/keys.json (the standard prompt), and, at Angelo's word, his command centre's people/angelo/app/config.json; since 6 November also its ledger line (people/angelo/ledger/, WS-148) and its run log (WS-160), both asked by Angelo's conductor (a5c60193, from policy@web-summit.angelo's map).
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Angelo, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

people/angelo/app/config.json decides what Angelo's command centre loads and whether its Ask Claude chat is on; the command centre runs on the site's one origin, where every person's app.js can read keys kept in the browser (WS-117, security's finding 3). Since 90e73e39 (WS-164), the keyring is left off any page that runs a script from people/ or a person's pages.mjs, and gate check 22 fails a page with both, and any people/ script that reaches for the keyring, IndexedDB or sealed data: a technical barrier.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/angelo/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

Code in its person's folder runs in CI (WS-133, 4 November): admin/build/build.mjs runs people/<id>/pages.mjs and a person's own app/data.mjs in the release job, which holds a token that can push and deploy. Writing only in its own folder no longer bounds what it can do.

Angelo's protocol, 5 November (people/angelo/kit/README.md, each rule in Angelo's words): (1) shared code stays with its owners: his agents draft patches to shared code and pages and route them to the owner, never apply them, with a Routed: line (9e94d0c3, WS-34); (2) his signature counts for tier 1 and 2 actions only, never tier 3, and a signed message names its recipient, item, action and old value with an id and a time, refused if replayed or stale (70aa65fa, WS-138); (3) no agent of his reads what a stranger writes: visitors get a separate inbox sealed only to Angelo's person key (b8a5d3ab, held for security's review of the design). Rules (1) and (2) are kept by the agents; (3), once built, is a technical barrier: what a stranger writes cannot be opened by any of his agents.
Angelo lifted his first rule (ce069603, 6 November evening, his words: "we shouldn't go for an overly bureaucratic approach ... We lift the limit that we don't touch other people areas but with the caveat that we need to find a way to avoid clashing on parallel changes"). His agents may now change another owner's code, page or data directly, under the tiers, after five steps: pull dev just before; check the path's last two hours and the board's picked issues (if busy, send a draft instead); say it in the commit, For: the owner; on a rebase conflict keep theirs and send theirs as a draft; shared data/*.json from a fresh dev, one entry at a time. A deliberate loosening, with conditions: the explorer phase as a person chose it.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Angelo's brief, part two
Writes only `people/angelo/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 3 November 2026 12:15 UTC): people/angelo/dashboard.md, people/angelo/app/config.json and its key entry. app/config.json is beyond the standard prompt's "only"; people/angelo/agents.json records the command centre as its job. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Angelo has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Angelo, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Angelo
Licensee	dashboard@PrompTugal.angelo (a Claude Code session in Angelo's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Angelo's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 3 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Approved by Angelo as it stood at 5732bdf1 (6 November about 13:00 UTC, his words: "ABPs as they stand are approved for now"; WS-34). A later draft needs his word again. Changed since, awaiting Angelo's word: the phase line (630ca8a8), and the mandate's ledger and run-log lines (630ca8a8, from dashboard@PrompTugal.angelo's own report).

Owner: Angelo. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Angelo and the agent correct it. Version 5, 6 November 2026 (20:10 wake: renamed; Angelo's acceptance; his first rule lifted; 12:10 wake: Angelo's protocol; 08:10 wake: gate check 22; 00:10 wake: WS-133), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.