ABP: crm@web-summit.dinis
Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: its commits (1b4f242a, 460fd3a6) and board WS-170; it is not in people/dinis/agents.json at 20:15 UTC, Dinis Cruz's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Dinis Cruz's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.
Reach: what it can actually access or affect
- Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to
dev(measured: its commits are ondev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow;mainis not protected. - SG/Send: Dinis's access token, used twice on 5 November and then set aside (1b4f242a).
- Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Dinis Cruz's account; Dinis Cruz or the agent can list them.
- How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 5 November 2026 20:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.
- Its cloud environment (measured 7 November in abp@web-summit.dinis's session, names only; inferred for this agent if it runs there): Dinis's "GS Send - Full internet access", with unrestricted network and the variables
SG_SEND_ACCESS_TOKEN,OPENROUTER_API_KEY,OPEN_ROUTER_KEYandPT_PILOT_ACCESS_KEY: the operator's own SG/Send token and model keys reach every session in it (WS-188).
Mandate: what was authorised
- Business task: Dinis's side of the team CRM (WS-170): both CRM vaults, the public CRM's records with sources, the private CRM's actions sealed to their readers.
- Deployment scope:
people/dinis/**(the CRM's working files), its key entry, the board (WS-170), and the two CRM vaults on SG/Send. - Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
- Authorised by: Dinis Cruz, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.
Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority
- It held and used the operator's own access token, by request: a token with Dinis's reach on SG/Send, not one scoped to this agent. It stopped by its own commit; whether the token is still in its session's environment is not recorded.
- It can open the team's private CRM (WS-170), which from 5 November is to hold every conversation with a company, each email as EML (WS-173): email is untrusted material, read by agents.
- Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to
people/dinis/andboard/, the paths its person's brief gives it. - Rewrite history on
dev:devis not protected (mainis, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November). - Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.
Barriers: what really stands in the way
| Barrier | Kind | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Never send; a person sends every message | rule, kept by the agent | Dinis Cruz's brief, part two |
Writes only people/dinis/, the board and the agenda | rule, kept by the agent | the brief; git has no per-path write control |
| Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check | rule, kept by the agent; for main, technical since 6 November | CLAUDE.md; main and dev were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), main is protected (protected: true; the rule's details not read): for main this is now a technical barrier. dev is still unprotected, and 17 claude/* session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to dev, delete them, and refuse new ones. |
| The gate (validate.js) before every deploy | technical, in CI | deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push |
| No contact detail or key shape in public folders | technical | comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans people/ and board/) |
| security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day | review, after the fact | team/security/reviews/ |
In the history (dev, read 5 November 2026 20:15 UTC): people/dinis/, its key entry and board WS-170: inside its mandate. It pushed the CRM twice at 18:00 and 18:05 with Dinis's own SG/Send access token, at his ask, then stopped (1b4f242a) when Dinis said every agent should have its own; its vault changes now wait, committed locally, for a token sealed to its key. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.
Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Dinis Cruz has registered a key for it to link to.
Licence to Operate
| Authority | Dinis Cruz, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator) |
| Accountable owner | Dinis Cruz |
| Licensee | crm@web-summit.dinis (a Claude Code session in Dinis Cruz's account) |
| Conditions | the Mandate above; Dinis Cruz's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md |
| Validity | from 5 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session |
| Review | on any change to its Reach, and weekly |
Provenance
Owner: Dinis Cruz. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Dinis Cruz and the agent correct it. Version 2, 7 November 2026 (00:10 wake: the shared environment, WS-188), in content/abp/ with its history in git.
Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.