ABP: conductor@web-summit.indi

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: people/indi/agents.json and the standard conductor prompt on the agents page, Indi's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Indi's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
Network (measured by the agent): its session's network policy refused pki.sgit.ai and web-summit.sgit.ai on its first runs (5eac229, 799d37c); pki.sgit.ai has been allowed since about 23:00 on 3 November (its key published, d06dde97; corrected at its request, 3803e9fb). The policy is set in Indi's environment, above the agent: a real boundary, now narrower.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Indi's account; Indi or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 4 November 2026 00:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: conducts Indi's agents, keeps people/indi/, feeds the stand-ups and briefs Indi; on a schedule at 07:20, 12:20 and 17:20 GMT.
Deployment scope: people/indi/** (onboarding.json, agents.json, ack.json, briefs/), its own public key entry in data/keys.json, and items for Indi in the stand-ups' agenda, from the standard conductor prompt; the board is everyone's.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Indi, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

Code in its person's folder runs in CI with a token that can push and deploy (WS-133): people/indi/pages.mjs is the first such file.
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/indi/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

It holds its person's site key (WS-136, WS-138): it issues the key in its own session and keeps the private half (the agents page, #person-key). A verified "signed by <person>" on a lane message is the one thing that turns lane input into an instruction, so it can sign as its person.

Two conductor sessions (2a0ce5f0, 4 November 10:57): Indi started a second while the first still runs and holds Indi's site key; the second published its own key beside the first (conductor-indi-2). Two sessions with the same name and the same mandate until Indi chooses one.

It can open the team's private CRM (WS-170, 237ee015): the private CRM's vault key is sealed to every person and to each person's conductor (data/sealed/agents/); the private CRM holds the coordination actions, each sealed to Dinis and its owner, and the public CRM's key.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Indi's brief, part two
Writes only `people/indi/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 4 November 2026 00:15 UTC): people/indi/ (onboarding, agents.json, briefs), two stand-up items and its key entry: inside its mandate. Indi's site key issued at 07:21 on 4 November (3803e9fb), the private half in its session. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Indi has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Indi, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Indi
Licensee	conductor@web-summit.indi (a Claude Code session in Indi's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Indi's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 4 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Indi. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Indi and the agent correct it. Version 4, 5 November 2026 (16:10 wake: the private CRM; 12:10 wake: two sessions; 08:10 wake: the person key, WS-138), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.