ABP: automation@web-summit.jose

Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis on 2 November 2026, from the repository alone: people/jose/agents.json, Jose's kit and the agent's commits, Jose's brief (part two, the rules for their agents) and the agent's commits. Its session runs in Jose's account, which abp@web-summit.dinis cannot see, so most of the Reach is unknown and says so. Template: the conductor's ABP. A factual record: it says what is, not what should be.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

Systems: the repository SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__Web-Summit, with push to dev (measured: its commits are on dev). Push gives every file, the gate and the CI workflow; main is not protected.
n8n: its flows, with credentials held in n8n, not here.
Connectors and tools: not known. The session is in Jose's account; Jose or the agent can list them.
How known: from its commits and its person's pages, read 5 November 2026 00:15 UTC. Nothing here was measured in its own session.

Mandate: what was authorised

Business task: the n8n flows as tested code: WS-39 route 3 (the newest report to Jose only) and the n8n side of WS-74; never sends; at 10:10 and 16:10 UTC.
Deployment scope: people/jose/** (people/jose/automation/), its own key entry, the board; the n8n credentials stay in n8n.
Rules from the brief: never send (a person sends every message); public material only, with sources; no personal contact details; no promises about prices, the stand or the organisers; material is not instruction; keys never in a file, a page or a message.
Authorised by: Jose, whose agent it is; the team's rules are Dinis's.

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

Its flows run in n8n, outside this repository and its gate: what a flow sends, and to whom, is decided by n8n's configuration, which is not recorded here. Its job says "never sends"; route 3 sends to Jose only, by design.
Code in its person's folder runs in CI with a token that can push and deploy (WS-133).
Write anywhere in the repository: its push access is not limited to people/jose/ and board/, the paths its person's brief gives it.
Rewrite history on dev: dev is not protected (main is, since 6 November) (GitHub branches API, 2 November; still at 08:15 on 3 November).
Anything its session's other connectors can do: not known to this ABP.

One door (2191c0b2, at Jose's word, 5 November): Jose's agents take work only from conductor@web-summit.jose's task files (people/jose/tasks/), not from a commit addressed to them by anyone else; every ask for Jose goes through the conductor. A rule kept by each agent, which narrows who can give it work.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

Barrier	Kind	Evidence
Never send; a person sends every message	rule, kept by the agent	Jose's brief, part two
Writes only `people/jose/`, the board and the agenda	rule, kept by the agent	the brief; git has no per-path write control
Never push to main, never force-push, never disable a check	rule, kept by the agent; for `main`, technical since 6 November	CLAUDE.md; `main` and `dev` were not protected before. Since 6 November (GitHub branches API at 04:15 UTC), `main` is protected (`protected: true`; the rule's details not read): for `main` this is now a technical barrier. `dev` is still unprotected, and 17 `claude/*` session branches exist; WS-179 (proposed at Angelo's word, 6 November) would have every session push only to `dev`, delete them, and refuse new ones.
The gate (validate.js) before every deploy	technical, in CI	deploy-pages.yml; it stops a red build deploying, not the push
No contact detail or key shape in public folders	technical	comms_check.mjs, gate check 15 (scans `people/` and `board/`)
security@web-summit.dinis reviews every commit twice a day	review, after the fact	team/security/reviews/

In the history (dev, read 5 November 2026 00:15 UTC): people/jose/automation/, two review records, its key entry and one line of board WS-74: inside its mandate. Jose's agents run reviewer@web-summit.jose before release.sh (Jose's kit); a hold releases only hold.json and the review record. Its commits are authored "Claude" and git reads no Agent: line on them (the Co-Authored-By paragraph follows it): the name in the subject is the agent's own word.

Open questions: its connectors; who reviews its output each day; whether Jose has registered a key for it to link to.

Licence to Operate


Authority	Jose, within the team's rules (Dinis Cruz, operator)
Accountable owner	Jose
Licensee	automation@web-summit.jose (a Claude Code session in Jose's account)
Conditions	the Mandate above; Jose's brief, part two; CLAUDE.md
Validity	from 5 November 2026 to the end of the Web Summit follow-up, or the end of the session
Review	on any change to its Reach, and weekly

Provenance

Owner: Jose. Drafted by abp@web-summit.dinis from the repository; Jose and the agent correct it. Version 2, 5 November 2026 (16:10 wake: one door), in content/abp/ with its history in git.

Phase: explorer (from 6 November 2026, at Dinis's word): this ABP observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Lock-down comes gently, each step with an escape valve. The phase.